A critical vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint Server, which was patched in May, has been exploited for weeks as an entry point for attacks on servers deployed within organizations. Known as CVE-2026-45659, this flaw allows for remote code execution and has led Microsoft to be listed in the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) catalog of actively exploited vulnerabilities. The theft of cryptographic keys from the server lies at the heart of the attack chain, demonstrating why the patch alone cannot close the breach.
A compromised SharePoint server exposes far more than its document libraries. As a pivotal component of internal collaborative services, it provides a gateway to the organization’s directory, file sharing, and service accounts. An attacker who gains control over this server inherits a foundation of trust upon which countless business applications, authentication flows, and shared permissions rely. CVE-2026-45659 presents exactly this exploit, boasting a severity score of 8.8 out of 10 and targeting servers managed in-house rather than Microsoft’s online service.
Microsoft released the patch in mid-May 2026. By early July, CISA confirmed active exploitation and added the vulnerability to its catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities, imposing a stringent remediation deadline on federal agencies. On July 14, CISA issued a hardening directive following further exploitation incidents, indicating that the wave of attacks was far from dissipating. At that time, CVE-2026-45659 was among several vulnerabilities being actively exploited within a particularly busy monthly patch cycle that also engaged teams working on other Microsoft products.
A Deserialization Flaw Leading to Code Execution
CVE-2026-45659 involves deserialization of untrusted data. The server reconstructs objects from inputs controlled by the attacker without adequate validation, allowing arbitrary code execution within the context of the SharePoint process. This type of vulnerability often affects applications leveraging legacy serialization mechanisms, and SharePoint extensively uses these to manage the state of its pages between the browser and the server. A carefully crafted input can then hijack this mechanism, compelling the server to execute instructions it deems legitimate.
Exploitation requires authenticated access, with at least site member privileges, a threshold that many internal deployments easily meet. This requirement distinguishes it from the previous incident; in 2025, the ToolShell chain would compromise SharePoint without any account required, making it exploitable from outside. CVE-2026-45659, however, necessitates a foothold inside, meaning that a stolen credential or a forgotten testing account can provide that access. The vulnerability affects on-premises installations, including SharePoint Server Subscription Edition, SharePoint Server 2019, and SharePoint Server 2016, while SharePoint Online remains unaffected. Organizations retaining control over their servers, often due to sovereignty or confidentiality concerns, are thus burdened with patching and monitoring responsibilities.
From Backdoors to Key Theft
The observed attack chain follows a now-familiar pattern. After code execution, the attacker plants a backdoor in the form of an illegitimate .aspx file within SharePoint directories, providing persistent remote access. This backdoor is then used to survey the environment, identify privileged accounts, and facilitate propagation throughout the domain. At this stage, the intrusion remains discreet, utilizing legitimate server pathways and blending in with normal activity.
A pivotal step targets the server’s cryptographic keys. By retrieving the ASP.NET machine keys, which sign and encrypt the application state returned by the browser, the attacker forges valid tokens and re-authenticates at will across any node in the farm. Persistence then relies on a stolen secret, undisturbed by the update, meaning that a patched server retains an open door if its keys have been compromised. Artifacts of this chain can be traced through server files and memory, including an unknown .aspx file within layout directories, unusual behavior from IIS worker processes, and unexpected key usage. These clues can remain visible long after the intrusion, provided that sufficient logging has been maintained.
Why the Patch Alone Doesn’t Close the Breach
Applying the May update is crucial, but its effectiveness diminishes if the server has already been compromised. As long as the stolen machine keys remain intact, the attacker’s access persists beyond the patch, turning what seems like a resolved incident into a dormant compromise. Complete remediation requires renewing these keys, restarting the affected web services, and searching for any backdoors that may have been placed. In a farm with multiple servers, these keys are shared to ensure session consistency, necessitating coordinated replacement to avoid leaving an open window.
CISA’s hardening directive supports this approach. The agency recommends enabling the antimalware analysis interface for SharePoint in Windows, enhancing logging, and treating any exposed server as potentially compromised—acting across the entire defense chain. Organizations are also urged to inventory SharePoint servers accessible from the internet, isolating them if uncertainty remains and initiating incident analysis as soon as any signs of compromise emerge. This shift alters the nature of IT teams’ responsibilities, moving from simply applying updates to methodically rebuilding trust in servers previously thought to be secure.
Storm-2603 Reruns the ToolShell Scenario
The final stage deploys the ultimate payload. Threat intelligence analyses indicate a shift in the library search order to launch the Warlock ransomware encryptor once persistence has been established. The collaborative server then serves as a springboard for domain-wide extortion, accompanied by data theft that has now become typical of such attacks. This double extortion model, where encryption is coupled with the threat of disclosure, raises the stakes for victims and positions a centrally located server as a high-value target.
Attribution points toward a known actor. Researchers link this campaign to Storm-2603, a group associated with China that previously exploited the ToolShell chain against the same on-premises SharePoint servers in 2025. The methods and goals echo, from key theft to ransomware deployment, one year after the initial incident. This continuity warrants cautious interpretation; designations of actors can vary between intelligence providers, making attribution a probabilistic exercise. What stands out is less the name of the group than the recurrence of a pattern that transforms a SharePoint vulnerability into a precursor for extortion.
For a French IT department, CVE-2026-45659 is more than just a security bulletin. It underscores that an on-premises collaborative server carries a perpetual surveillance obligation, with the sovereignty of a deployment requiring ongoing operational vigilance. Entities subject to European regulatory obligations under the NIS2 directive must also trace and report intrusions of this nature. The focus in the coming months will shift from simply deploying patches to renewing keys and thoroughly auditing servers before ransomware strikes.



