The EU’s Cloud Sovereignty Framework: A Balancing Act Between Control and Flexibility.
Under scrutiny for its rigid regulatory framework, the European Union is seeking to soften its previously hardline sovereignty stance in the tech sector. The new cloud framework, released in October 2025, proposes a more nuanced approach, shifting the concept of sovereignty from a binary requirement to a modular set of guarantees that can adapt to specific contexts. However, this effort to accommodate various stakeholders risks diluting the very essence of sovereignty.
The European “Cloud Sovereignty Framework” version 1.2.1 introduces, for the first time, a common normative architecture for public tenders that involve cloud services. Structured around eight sovereignty objectives (SOV-1 to SOV-8), the framework addresses critical areas such as strategic governance, applicable jurisdiction, data processing, supply chain management, operational resilience, and environmental impact. Each provider is assigned a level of assurance ranging from SEAL-0 to SEAL-4, based on their alignment with established principles. A comprehensive sovereignty score, weighted by criteria, complements this assessment.
On the surface, the framework aims for a systemic alignment with existing initiatives like CIGREF, Gaia-X, and the European cybersecurity framework (ENISA). However, it reflects a deliberate compromise between a doctrine of strategic autonomy and openness to competition, intending to enhance transparency while avoiding the automatic exclusion of non-European players. This hybrid positioning creates an impression of rigor but allows for varying interpretations that could undermine its intended goals.
SEAL-3: The Ambiguity of Sovereignty Without Control
At the center of the debate is SEAL-3, characterized as a state of “digital resilience” where Europe maintains significant influence over cloud services without exerting exclusive control. Providers can meet requirements by ensuring service continuity, local operations, and compliance with European laws while still holding technical or legal dependencies on entities outside the EU. In contrast, SEAL-4 represents a state of total sovereignty, wherein services are exclusively controlled by European entities and governed solely by EU law, free from critical foreign dependencies.
The coexistence of these two levels, presented as a strategic flexibility, introduces significant ambiguity. Many public contracts could be awarded to operators with only a SEAL-3 rating, provided they meet minimum criteria. This logic implies that sovereignty is no longer an end goal but rather a variable state. In sensitive sectors like healthcare, defense, and critical infrastructure, this dilution of the sovereignty concept could jeopardize the genuine control over digital supply chains. By tolerating structural dependencies in the name of resilience, the EU risks straying from its technological autonomy doctrine.
Sovereignty Defined by Buyers… and Subject to Interpretation
The sovereignty framework does not dictate a one-size-fits-all approach but instead delegates to public buyers the responsibility of establishing minimum SEAL requirements for specific tenders. An administration might require a SEAL-4 for legal sovereignty while accepting a SEAL-2 for operational or environmental factors. While this allows for tailored requirements based on industry contexts, it also paves the way for opaque decision-making. Similar projects could be entrusted to providers with vastly different sovereignty profiles, depending solely on the flexibility of tender specifications.
This mechanism could also facilitate circumvention strategies. Well-informed providers may calibrate their responses to maximize their Sovereignty Score without ensuring actual technological or legal independence. In a competitive market environment, the temptation to prioritize a favorable score over true sovereignty is significant. The framework lacks mandatory certification mechanisms and systematic independent audits, raising concerns about the normative weight of the evaluations, especially in the absence of alignment with stricter standards like SecNumCloud.
CISPE Calls Out “Sovereignty Washing”
Shortly after the framework’s release, the CISPE (Cloud Infrastructure Services Providers in Europe) issued a pointed critique titled “No Such Thing as 75% Organic.” This document decries the very idea of partial sovereignty, likening it to a product claiming organic status while only partly meeting standards. The organization denounces what it terms “sovereignty washing,” whereby providers remain reliant on extraterritorial infrastructure, laws, or technologies while branding themselves as compliant with European doctrine.
CISPE advocates for stringent, independent, and harmonized verification of sovereignty criteria akin to the SecNumCloud framework developed by the French cybersecurity agency, ANSSI. They also warn of the potential for public buyers and end-users to misinterpret a high score as indicative of total control, when in reality it reflects a mere weighted aggregate. According to the collective, only complete legal, technical, and operational sovereignty can fulfill the ambitions set forth by the Commission regarding digital resilience.
Moving Toward Functional or Modular Sovereignty?
Beyond the criticisms, the European framework marks a strategic shift. Rather than enforcing a dogmatic vision of sovereignty, the EU appears to favor a modular approach: each provider can craft their sovereignty profile based on their strengths, while each buyer defines their risk tolerance. This logic could encourage the emergence of hybrid configurations where European components enhance global offerings without necessitating a complete break with non-European players. It also mirrors the complexities of the cloud market, characterized by technological interdependencies, global standardization dynamics, and asymmetric competition.
Yet, this strategic realism stands in stark contrast to previous initiatives and the strategy deployed thus far. As a sovereign European ecosystem begins to take shape—driven by resolute policy and grassroots movements—the EU’s proposals risk being perceived as a regrettable retreat. While useful in the short term, this approach may prove perilous in the long run. The European Union must quickly clarify its stance to prevent its cloud framework from becoming a mere labeling exercise devoid of genuine influence on industrial trajectories. A sovereignty without verifiability or coherence may inadvertently reinforce, rather than mitigate, power asymmetries in the digital economy.



