Eset Research has identified two new Windows variants of the SprySOCKS backdoor, attributed to the cyberespionage group FishMonger. Named WIN_DRV and WIN_PLUS, these variants have targeted government organizations in Honduras, Taiwan, Thailand, and Pakistan, with telemetry data indicating their activity spans from 2023 to 2024. Both variants support TCP, UDP, and WebSocket communications, exposing over thirty remote control commands.
Previously, SprySOCKS was only observed on Linux platforms. Its transition to Windows marks a significant expansion of FishMonger’s toolkit, closely aligned with the Winnti group. FishMonger is believed to be operated by the Chinese contractor I-SOON, based in Chengdu, and is also tracked under various aliases including Earth Lusca, TAG-22, Aquatic Panda, and Red Dev 10.
State-sponsored cyberespionage has broadened its operational reach as attack chains have become more industrialized, moving from public clouds to network equipment. The emergence of SprySOCKS illustrates a trend where operators adapt proven tools across different platforms to maintain surveillance on their targets rather than starting from scratch with new developments.
Attribution should be approached with caution. It relies on telemetry and code analysis from Eset, which links FishMonger to the long-standing Winnti collective of Chinese operations and posits that I-SOON is executing these attacks. This subcontracting model, where a private company conducts campaigns on behalf of a state sponsor, has been documented since the leak of internal data from I-SOON, shedding light on how these tools circulate and become more professionalized.
### A Windows Port that Retains Its Linux Architecture
Initial samples were spotted on the VirusTotal platform in April 2024, but Eset’s telemetry suggests that operational activity dates back to 2023-2024. The two variants, WIN_DRV and WIN_PLUS, had not been previously documented and communicate with their command infrastructure over TCP, UDP, and WebSocket, providing multiple fallback channels in case one is filtered.
The WIN_DRV variant manages over thirty remote control commands, which cover system information gathering, process enumeration, Windows service management, and a range of file operations, including creation, deletion, transfer, and inventory. This backdoor retains much of the architecture of its Linux counterpart, including the communication protocol with the command server, encryption mechanisms, and command processing logic.
Martin Smolár, the Eset researcher responsible for the analysis, elaborates on this porting. “The Windows version retains the core architecture of its Linux equivalent, notably the C&C communication protocol, encryption methods, and command processing logic. However, it also includes Windows-specific features and significantly enhances its concealment capabilities through the use of kernel drivers,” he explains.
### A Kernel Driver Enhancing Stealth
The key innovation lies in the kernel driver, which elevates the stealth level of the backdoor. This component conceals network connections, processes, files, and registry keys associated with the malware. It also hijacks TCP traffic, allowing operators to send commands via an arbitrary port on the compromised machine without exposing the actual listening port in network communications. The driver activates only when specific traffic patterns are detected, further minimizing the traces left during normal operations.
This technique complicates detection by tools monitoring known listening ports since the command channel hides behind seemingly benign traffic triggered by a specific signature. For security teams, this shifts the detection effort towards behavioral analysis of the kernel and monitoring loaded drivers, rather than solely inspecting visible network flows.
### A Compromise Pathway Down to Boot Time
Eset also raises an additional, yet conditional, perspective. Their telemetry data suggests that certain attack chains involving SprySOCKS may utilize a UEFI bootkit, potentially exploiting the CVE-2023-24932 vulnerability. This flaw, disclosed by Microsoft in May 2023 and associated with the BlackLotus bootkit, allows attackers to bypass Secure Boot to execute code before Windows loads. Microsoft has emphasized that its patch alone is insufficient; manual revocation of vulnerable boot managers is still necessary to close the gap.
The prospect of firmware-level persistence, which is invisible to traditional antivirus and detection solutions, justifies Eset’s recommendation for close monitoring of FishMonger’s activities. This group is not new to the cyber landscape; Eset had previously documented their operations back in 2020 during campaigns targeting universities in Hong Kong amidst the 2019 protests. FishMonger is also known for conducting watering hole attacks and their toolkit includes ShadowPad, Spyder, Cobalt Strike, FunnySwitch, SprySOCKS, and BIOPASS RAT.
For security officials, this update calls for a reassessment rather than an immediate reactive measure. While the primary targets appear governmental and outside Europe, the described techniques—including cross-platform porting, kernel driver concealment, and startup persistence—are within reach of other actors. Checking the status of Secure Boot revocations and monitoring loaded kernel drivers are among the controls this case highlights, underscoring the need for vigilance in evolving cyber threats.



