Theft of €6.3 billion at Binance, diverted signatures were enough to drain the platform

North Korean Hackers Steal $6.3 Billion from Binance Without Hacking a Key

In a staggering breach, North Korean hackers have siphoned approximately $6.3 billion from Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, all without compromising a single security key. Instead, they exploited Binance’s signature system to authorize transfers directly to themselves.

The FBI has attributed the theft, which occurred on October 29, to North Korea and identified the perpetrators as a group dubbed “TraderTraitor.” This group is also implicated in the $1.5 billion heist that targeted the cryptocurrency platform Bybit in February 2025. Binance plans to absorb the losses through its user protection fund, the Secure Asset Fund for Users (SAFU), alongside its own finances, and has managed to freeze about $3 billion in assets with the help of its partners.

Initially, Binance suggested that the compromise started with a hacked engineer’s laptop. However, on October 30, the company acknowledged the discovery of “additional points of compromise” and referred to the incident as a “complex attack,” without yet releasing a full incident report. By November 1, Binance claimed to have recovered 95% of the stolen funds and began reinstating withdrawals gradually. Nonetheless, blockchain analysis revealed a visible transaction trail, prompting firms like TRM Labs and Elliptic to reconstruct the sequence of events, illustrating an operation that had been meticulously planned in advance.

Two Days of Planning, Twenty Minutes of Execution

The planning phase began on October 28. According to TRM Labs, the attacker initiated the operation by receiving three small withdrawals from Tornado Cash, a service designed to obscure the origins of funds. The following day, they deployed a “sweeper” contract—software crafted to empty a wallet upon command—and tested it on two wallets. Soon after, they installed the same code on a Binance “hot” wallet, which facilitates standard withdrawals, around four hours later.

Execution commenced on October 29 at 9:05 PM Paris time. Within four minutes, five Binance wallets on the XRP ledger dispatched 233 million XRP tokens to a single address. At 9:20 PM, 18,270 Bitcoin were transferred from their designated hot wallet, while the Tron wallet quickly relinquished 612.7 million USDT—a dollar-pegged stablecoin—within two minutes. Following that, transfers from Solana and Optimism wallets occurred, with those from Avalanche and Polygon falling later that night. According to Elliptic, the majority of the stolen assets exited the relevant blockchains in just about thirty minutes.

Fifty Signatures to Drain the Ethereum Wallet

On Ethereum, the attacker leveraged EIP-7702, a network upgrade that allows a wallet to delegate its functionalities to a contract via a single signed authorization. At 9:20 PM, one transaction included fifty such permissions signed by Binance’s hot wallet key, each corresponding to successive values on its transaction counter. This counter, continuously advancing, ensured that at least one authorization remained valid at the time of execution. Just three minutes and twenty-four seconds later, the wallet relinquished 167,464 ethers and 63 tokens, including $1.6 billion in USDT.

The delegation of permissions persisted, allowing the compromised wallet to continue following the sweeper contract, which absorbed incoming deposits until 12:56 AM on October 30. This wallet also commanded another Binance account, from which the attacker withdrew 823 million USDC, Circle’s stablecoin. On different blockchains, the attacker mostly relied on properly signed transfers. TRM Labs concludes that they likely managed to manipulate the signature system of Binance’s hot wallets across all chains.

Targeting Individuals and Infrastructure, Not Cryptography

This breach exhibits similarities to the Bybit theft, as noted by Elliptic, which stated that “the infrastructure and people were compromised, not the cryptography.” In Bybit’s case, the intruder accessed the system through a developer’s machine associated with Safe{Wallet}, the wallet provider. Elliptic also connects the laundering of stolen funds to other previous hacks attributed to TraderTraitor against platforms like BigONE, WOO X, and AFX, as well as a heist on Bitget in September. Cybersecurity experts suggest that the incident highlights a failure in privileged access management rather than an exotic vulnerability, underscoring a critical architecture lesson.

The narrowing of the loss can be attributed to centralized actors. Tether and Circle, the issuers of USDT and USDC, froze their tokens within an hour. Ripple and World Liberty Financial similarly acted on their tokens, while the security council of the Arbitrum network recovered the attacker’s funds on its chain. However, native assets like Bitcoin and Ether evade such measures. The FBI notes that the attacker mainly converted their loot into Ether before laundering it through decentralized finance services and instant exchanges. The FBI, Secret Service, and Criminal Investigation Division of the U.S. Treasury have urged operators to block the addresses released.

Separating the Signature from the Administrative Access Points

This incident’s lessons extend beyond the world of cryptocurrencies, assuming their implications are clearly defined. A cryptocurrency exchange’s information system differs significantly from those of typical enterprises. However, any organization that electronically signs payments, deployments, or code possesses keys that could be hijacked. TRM Labs recommends segregating the signature infrastructure by blockchain and wallet level, while also monitoring for unexpected delegations. For companies, this translates to compartmentalizing their signature systems, isolating them from everyday administrative posts, and detecting any unusual authorizations.

Detection must occur as swiftly as the attack. There were four hours between the last rehearsal of the attack and the total heist, with about thirty minutes sufficient for most of the stolen assets, followed by three more hours of withdrawals utilizing the delegated permissions. No defense can completely prevent the initial click of a compromised engineer. However, identifying an unauthorized signature within minutes and knowing precisely who to contact to freeze the funds can significantly limit losses. Binance has promised a comprehensive incident report after concluding its investigation.

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