States remain silent about their cross-border cyber incidents, and the European response to cyber incidents operates in the dark

The European Court of Auditors has found that national authorities are not reporting most cross-border cyber incidents, as required by the NIS 2 directive, leaving cooperation networks and EU-funded centers operating with incomplete information. This lack of reporting has stalled the European alert system.

In its Special Report 19/2026, released on September 21, the Court highlighted that the EU’s response to cross-border cyber incidents is hampered by member states’ failure to report adequately. In 2025, only seven countries reported 14 significant incidents that affected multiple countries, while the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) identified 322 such incidents from open sources in the same year.

In 2024, member states reported a total of 1,276 incidents, yet ENISA detected approximately 4,800 incidents between June 2024 and June 2025. The audit covered the period from 2022 to 2025, including checks in Ireland, Greece, and Italy. “Timely access to actionable information is essential when a serious cyber incident occurs,” emphasized George-Marius Hyzler, the Court member responsible for the audit.

The Collins Aerospace Attack: No Alerts Triggered Among States

In September 2025, Collins Aerospace, a passenger tracking systems provider, experienced a ransomware attack that disrupted airports in Brussels, Berlin, and London Heathrow. This incident met the criteria for a significant incident under NIS 2. However, no member state formally notified ENISA or its neighboring countries. The EU-CyCLONe network, which comprises crisis management authorities, did not coordinate any response.

Since 2016, the EU has not classified any incident as major, including WannaCry, NotPetya, or the global outage caused by a CrowdStrike update. Consequently, the escalation procedures established for crises have never been used. Each national authority independently assesses the cross-border implications of an incident, and there is no European platform that consolidates real-time declarations.

National Secrecy Limits Information Sharing

Member states often restrict information sharing when the data from an attack against a critical entity is classified or pertains to national security. The Court noted that no analysis of national legal frameworks and their impact on information exchange has been conducted at the EU level. Under the original NIS directive, notifications were already scarce despite being mandatory, primarily due to unclear procedures and a lack of shared interest in reporting.

Progress on notifications has not improved with the transposition of NIS 2. By the October 2024 deadline, only two out of twenty-seven states had adopted the directive. France is among the four countries that the European Commission referred to the Court of Justice of the EU on July 8, 2026, for failing to comply, seeking financial penalties. The networks of CSIRTs (national computer security incident response teams) and EU-CyCLONe have yet to formalize their collaboration, and neither has established a severity taxonomy or common classification criteria.

European Tools Developed Without Essential Data

Due to the lack of declarations, the Commission has had to purchase its threat knowledge. In December 2022, it contracted external providers for nearly €18 million over four years to establish its Cyber Situational Awareness Center. According to the Court, this work overlaps partially with ENISA’s monitoring capabilities. The contract is set to expire in December 2026, with no follow-up plans in place at the time of the audit.

The European Cyber Alert System, which was designed to detect threats earlier through its cross-border hubs ATHENA and ENSOC, has not been launched. These hubs have been awaiting resources since a procurement process began between May and July 2024. Selected candidates were only notified in April 2025, and no contracts had been signed eighteen months after the initiative began. To mitigate these delays, grant agreements have been extended by fifteen to eighteen months.

The Court recommends that the Commission analyze national restrictions on sharing information by 2027 and 2028, establish a single entry point for cross-border incidents, and enable real-time reporting to ENISA. Until then, a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) operating in multiple member states cannot rely on the EU to alert them about ongoing incidents in neighboring countries. Their best channels for early warning remain their monitoring, engagement with peers, and relationships with critical suppliers.

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