The National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI), the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (ACPR), and the Bank of France have renewed their agreement on July 3, 2026, enhancing their collaborative efforts in safeguarding the information systems of the financial sector. This agreement facilitates information sharing among the three institutions regarding cybersecurity incidents, mutual oversight, crisis management, and threat-based penetration testing mandated by the European DORA regulation.
Signing the agreement were Vincent Strubel, CEO of ANSSI; Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France; and Emmanuelle Assouan, Secretary General of the ACPR. This move comes amid increasing cyber threats, with each agency retaining its statutory role: the CERT-FR focuses on technical incident response, the ACPR oversees compliance with the DORA regulation implemented in January 2025, and the Bank of France ensures the resilience of financial infrastructures. “Strengthening our coordination is essential, especially with the emergence of a new generation of AI tools that heighten the speed and intensity of attacks,” noted Emmanuelle Assouan. Denis Beau characterized the cyber threat as a systemic risk to the financial sector, comparable to credit or liquidity shocks.
This cooperation is not entirely new; Vincent Strubel emphasized that it formalizes a partnership originally initiated in 2018 with the ACPR, followed by a similar letter of intent with the Financial Markets Authority (AMF). The agreement references DORA and the NIS2 directive, both part of a broader European regulatory framework, establishing the institutions’ roles in digital resilience without relying on an incomplete transposition of NIS2 in France.
Four Key Areas of Cooperation, Without an Information Exchange Framework
Both the ANSSI and ACPR communications outline four common areas of focus: cybersecurity incidents and threats, mutual audits and assistance, crisis management, and threat-based penetration testing as required by DORA for critical entities. However, neither agency specifies a tool, database, or automated channel for facilitating these exchanges. The term used—enhancing information sharing—remains an organizational intent rather than a concrete mechanism.
This lack of detail isn’t unique to 2026; the ACPR-ANSSI cooperation from 2018 was similarly described, yet no public assessment has clarified the nature of the exchanges established since then. Consequently, renewing an agreement with an identical purpose after eight years feels more like a renewal than a progressive step.
One Year Earlier, the Court of Auditors Deemed Coordination Insufficient
On June 16, 2025, thirteen months prior to this agreement, the Court of Auditors released a report evaluating the state’s response to cyber threats targeting civil information systems. While praising ANSSI’s technical expertise, the report criticized its “alone against all” approach, deemed unsustainable in light of the escalating demands and limited capacity to handle simultaneous attacks on multiple systemic operators. The Court urged a reorganization of state cybersecurity governance and called for enhanced sanctioning powers for ANSSI before the NIS2 transposition.
Thus, an independent audit conducted a year ahead of the agreement revealed that coordination between institutions responsible for civil and financial cybersecurity was still poorly managed. The ANSSI-ACPR-Bank of France agreement echoes declaratory language identified as a weakness by the Court of Auditors, promoting renewed intent without a detailed mechanism. It reads more as a response to documented criticism than proof of coordinated resolve.
Critical Service Providers: Effective Centralization Happens at the European Level
Yet, a centralized supervisory infrastructure exists at the European level within the DORA ecosystem, concerning critical IT service providers utilized by many entities. Since 2025, three European supervisory authorities have been conducting oversight forums and joint review teams to assess the risks posed by these providers to the sector.
This framework represents a genuine centralization of information and oversight, supported by dedicated teams and formalized procedures. The French agreement, however, does not integrate this centralized approach. Its only connection lies in the threat-based penetration testing domain, wherein national intelligence from ANSSI is expected to inform testing scenarios for the most critical financial entities, under the supervision of the ACPR.
What This Changes, and What Remains Pending for Financial Sector CISOs
For institutions subject to DORA since January 2025, the foundation that this agreement aims to better circulate is still in development. According to the ACPR’s end-of-2025 report, 84% of entities submitted their information registers, but only 39% received validation at the European level, and compliance timelines for notifying major incidents are often overlooked. Notably, a single incident involving a third-party provider named Harvest inflated the reported incident count. Enhancing information circulation holds little value if it remains incomplete at its source.
Entities outside the financial sector that NIS2 is supposed to cover are waiting for the transposition law, referred to as the Resilience Law, which missed its October 2024 deadline, resulting in an infringement procedure against France. As of the date of this agreement, it was still only a text under parliamentary review, with promulgation expected in summer 2026. Consequently, these fifteen thousand entities have no new obligations arising from this agreement, which merely offers them a glimpse into the model they need to negotiate with ANSSI, which has already published a NIS2 compliance framework that can be utilized.
For a CISO following this matter, the takeaway lies less in the signing of the agreement than in the context surrounding it. An independent audit had raised concerns about the guidance of cyber coordination among these same institutions a year earlier, and effective centralization is occurring at the European level. The recommendations from the Court of Auditors and the real timetable for the Resilience Law remain critical indicators to monitor whether this coordination moves beyond mere appearances.



