Proofpoint’s research reveals the subsequent activities that unfold after an initial breach, often unnoticed by detection systems in the ensuing weeks. Researchers from the Threat Research team have maintained an active intrusion within a decoy environment operated by Deception.pro for over thirty days, enabling them to observe the tools, scripts, and decision-making processes of an actor specializing in physical goods theft. Their findings uncover a significant post-compromise arsenal, including on-demand signing capabilities designed to neutralize certificate revocation mechanisms.
Remote Management and Monitoring (RMM) tools, ubiquitous in organizations, have become the primary payload used by criminal actors targeting road transport across North America and Europe since 2025. Cyber intrusions now serve as a systematic gateway to the physical theft of goods. Just three days after gaining initial access, the malicious actor manually navigated to PayPal through the victim’s browser. Eight days post-compromise, a PyInstaller binary scanned the victim’s browser extensions and cryptocurrency wallets, exfiltrating the results to Telegram bots under the attacker’s control. These sequences, observed in real-time within the decoy environment, illustrate the hybrid nature of a threat that intertwines cyber intrusion with physical goods theft. The American Trucking Associations estimates that annual losses attributed to freight theft reach $35 billion globally.
Historically, investments in cybersecurity by transportation and logistics organizations have chiefly focused on preventing intrusions and securing business communications. However, preparation for the post-compromise phase—which unfolds silently for days or weeks following initial access—has been largely neglected in resilience frameworks. This research, which captures an ongoing intrusion without interruption, partially addresses this visibility gap by providing a detailed mapping of the actor’s behavior, tools, and decision-making sequence.
A Fake Load Announcement as the Initial Access Vector
The attack originates from an online freight marketplace, known in the industry as a “load board”—platforms where shippers, brokers, and carriers post and book loads. The actor compromised a legitimate account on one of these platforms, posting a fraudulent announcement and then emailing every carrier that responded to the offer. The message contained an attachment in the form of a VBScript file. Once executed, this file downloads and launches a second PowerShell script while presenting a fake carrier-broker agreement to obscure the ongoing activity.
The second script constructs a download URL linked to a Windows installer for ScreenConnect, hosted on infrastructure controlled by the attacker. ScreenConnect is a widely used tool for remote management and administration in corporate settings. Installing it on a carrier employee’s machine grants the attacker full control over the device. Proofpoint notes that within this single intrusion, multiple installations occurred, including SimpleHelp RMM, Pulseway RMM, and four distinct instances of ScreenConnect. This deliberate redundancy ensures persistent access, even if one connection is detected and severed.
The threat actor has been active since at least June 2025, and possibly since January of that same year, according to researchers. Proofpoint is currently monitoring over a dozen active groups within this sector, which utilize the same RMM tools as their primary payload. SimpleHelp and N-able each account for 38% of the first infections observed since August 2025, while ScreenConnect represents 14%. These groups target a wide spectrum of victims, from family-owned small businesses to major transportation corporations, with no apparent selection criteria.
Thirteen PowerShell Scripts to Identify the Victim’s Bank
During the intrusion, the actor executed at least thirteen PowerShell scripts, all aimed at determining whether the compromised device belonged to a user with exploitable financial authority. These scripts enumerate local accounts, extract browsing history, and identify URLs associated with U.S. banking platforms, fleet payment systems, fuel card services, accounting software, and freight brokerage platforms. The results are automatically relayed to Telegram bots controlled by the attacker, providing real-time financial mapping of the victim.
At the end of March, an additional PowerShell script was executed via ScreenConnect’s custom property feature, a channel that generates minimal distinct network traffic and does not trigger separate alerts. This script enumerated installed antivirus software and checked for the presence of high-value financial, tax, and cryptocurrency management applications. The results were returned directly to the attacker’s ScreenConnect console, leaving no additional traces on the network. “The range of these targets aligns strongly with financial theft, fraud, and freight diversion operations tied to transport flows,” states the Proofpoint Threat Research team.
An On-Demand Service to Neutralize Certificate Revocation
The discovery of an on-demand signing capability represents the most significant finding of this research from a security team perspective. Proofpoint identified the use of a previously unreported third-party service enabling the signing of malware installers with valid digital certificates. During this intrusion, ScreenConnect installers were resigned with a fraudulent certificate issued in the name of “STEPHEN WHANG, CPA, INC.,” valid from December 23, 2025, to December 24, 2026. This mechanism effectively neutralizes protections based on certificate revocation and eliminates security warnings during installation.
This technique allows the attacker to replace any revoked binary with a valid resigned version on demand, significantly reducing the detection window available for SOC teams. “These actions enabled the attacker to establish and maintain persistent remote access while actively bypassing certificate revocations, security warnings, and endpoint trust checks,” note the researchers at Proofpoint. The existence of a market for on-demand signing services for criminal actors marks a structural evolution in the threat landscape, extending beyond this specific case.
Diverted Freight, Bank Fraud, and Cryptocurrencies
The ultimate goal of this attack chain transcends traditional data theft. Gaining access to a carrier’s systems allows the actor to fraudulently bid on real loads, take logistical responsibility, and then physically divert the goods to warehouses controlled by organized crime groups. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence that the actor operates in association with these groups. Two modes of physical theft have been observed: in the first, drivers are directly complicit in the criminal operation; in the second, a double brokering technique involves reselling the freight to a legitimate carrier, who unwittingly delivers it to a destination controlled by criminals.
Parallel financial reconnaissance indicates a broader monetization objective beyond mere freight theft. The actor simultaneously targets cryptocurrency wallets, online payment platforms, and banking access identified on the compromised machines. “These actors are well-versed in the transportation industry and know how to compromise carriers, bid on loads, and steal freight; but they also engage in what most cybercriminals do: seeking to monetize everything they find on a compromised machine,” explains Ole Villadsen, a senior researcher at Proofpoint.
Organizations in the transportation and logistics sector have immediate, actionable means to reduce their attack surface: restrict RMM tool installations on user machines, detect outbound network connections to unknown ScreenConnect or SimpleHelp instances, block VBScript attachments and executable files received via email, and monitor outgoing flows to Telegram from workstations. The National Motor Freight Traffic Association (NMFTA) has published a framework for reducing freight crime, with technical controls directly applicable to these attack scenarios.



