Proofpoint Uncovers New Malware-as-a-Service: TrustConnect
At the end of January 2026, cybersecurity firm Proofpoint identified a novel malware-as-a-service (MaaS) package named TrustConnect. This remote access Trojan (RAT), priced at $300 per month, was cleverly disguised behind a fake remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool website that boasted an Extended Validation (EV) certificate. It was distributed by various cybercriminal groups through multilingual email campaigns and had already rebranded itself as DocConnect just 24 hours after the takedown of its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
In the realm of cyber threats, the exploitation of legitimate RMM tools such as SimpleHelp, ScreenConnect, and LogMeIn has been a favored entry point for attackers for years. TrustConnect represents a significant departure from this trend; rather than hijacking an existing tool, its creators developed a completely fictional remote management software—complete with a website generated by a language model, fabricated customer statistics, and simulated technical documentation—to sell a RAT under the guise of a legitimate RMM provider. The domain trustconnectsoftware.com was registered on January 12, 2026, and by January 27, following the acquisition of an EV certificate for “TrustConnect Software PTY LTD,” several distinct actors began distributing the RAT through email campaigns in English and French.
The acquisition of an Extended Validation certificate is central to TrustConnect’s evasion strategy. These certificates, issued after thorough vetting of the requesting entity, cost several thousand dollars and provide a high level of trust in the eyes of digital signature-based security solutions. By signing each malicious executable with this valid certificate starting January 27, 2026, TrustConnect’s operators rendered their files undetectable by standard reputation and signature checks. Each MaaS customer received at least eight distinct executables, each signed with the metadata of the impersonated brand, leading to numerous hash variations that complicated detection through fingerprinting.
Full Control via Unauthenticated WebSocket
In a collaborative effort with The Cert Graveyard, Proofpoint succeeded in revoking the EV certificate on February 6, 2026. However, revocation is not retroactive, meaning that files signed prior to this date remained valid. The operators halted new subscriptions on that date, but current clients could continue to distribute their payloads. This scenario illustrates a structural limitation in current public key infrastructures (PKIs): revocations occur post-distribution rather than preemptively.
Additionally, the C2 panel provided a PowerShell one-liner script for the silent installation of the RAT, compatible with ClickFix-style attacks. This multi-vector deployment capability—via email, online script, or signed executable—significantly expanded the potential attack surface for MaaS clients.
TrustConnect’s remote administration capabilities encompass everything required for post-initial access compromise. The C2 dashboard supports arbitrary command execution, file transfers, system navigation, and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions. This screen stream is transmitted over unauthenticated WebSockets—a particularly problematic vector, as it exposes sessions to any entity capable of intercepting the network traffic between the agent and its C2 server. The RDP session allows full mouse and keyboard control, continuous screen capture, User Account Control (UAC) bypass, and the ability to obscure the operator’s activity from the victim.
Multiple Actors Operating on the Same MaaS
Proofpoint observed the deployment of ScreenConnect as a second-stage payload from nine distinct self-hosted instances, all of which displayed expired or revoked certificates, over a span of ten days. Hands-on-keyboard activity was noted only minutes after the installation of TrustConnect, indicating that several independent actors were simultaneously operating on the same MaaS. A commercial RMM tool (Level RMM) was also deployed via a compromised account, which was later disabled by the vendor following Proofpoint’s report.
The integrated audit log within the C2 records all actions—installations, deployments, executed commands—in real time, without an option for clients to purge logs. This lack of log-clearing functionality represents a forensic exposure for the operators, but also provides a valuable data source for incident response teams during a compromise.
Established Links to a VIP Client of Redline
The attribution of TrustConnect relies on several converging elements. The Telegram handle @zacchyy09, used as a support and sales channel for the MaaS, appeared in data released during Operation Magnus—the October 2024 crackdown by the Dutch National Police against Redline and META stealers—indicating it belonged to a VIP Redline client. Proofpoint assesses, with moderate confidence, that the operator of TrustConnect was also a Redline stealer client prior to its dismantling.
This connection underscores a phenomenon documented by Proofpoint: successive disruptions of established MAAS providers—like Redline, Lumma Stealer, and Rhadamanthys—create market opportunities for new operators. Displaced actors migrate to alternative tools or, as in this case, become creators of their own MaaS. Priced at $300 per month in cryptocurrency (Bitcoin or USDT), with automated transaction verification via the blockchain, it targets a cybercriminal clientele well-versed in subscription models.
The rapid reconstitution of infrastructure following takedown operations highlights the operational resilience of the ThreatConnect actors. The identified successor, DocConnect, adopts a React single-page application architecture linked to Supabase, integrates SignalR in place of raw WebSockets, and allows for the inclusion of PDF decoys directly within the installer. Proofpoint notes that both platforms exhibit stylistic artifacts characteristic of AI-assisted development, with DocConnect showcasing significantly superior technical sophistication compared to TrustConnect in just a few weeks.
Identities Exposed Despite Apparent Anonymization
The design of the TrustConnect MaaS reveals a structural contradiction between the promised anonymity for clients and the data collected by the platform. Each operator is identified by a clear email address, organizational name, internal UUID, and unique installation token embedded in each distributed executable. Cryptocurrency payment verification hinges on the submission of the transaction hash—publicly traceable on the blockchain—thus enabling the MaaS operator to establish a database linking each client to their transactions, wallet addresses, Telegram tokens, and organizations. Clients who believed they were operating under the cloak of cryptographic anonymity were, in reality, subject to full re-identification by the platform operator.
The administrator dashboard, accessible only to the “SuperAdmin,” openly displays a complete list of all compromised devices, regardless of which client deployed the agent. This centralized architecture, where a single actor controls all victims across its clientele, poses a systemic risk: compromising the C2—or co-opted cooperation—exposes all active deployments. This very leverage was what Proofpoint and its partners exploited to neutralize the infrastructure on February 17, 2026.
The emergence of TrustConnect and the speed of its rebranding to DocConnect signal a heightened professionalization within the MaaS market: actors from the stealing ecosystem transitioning into RAT publishers, capable of producing sophisticated platforms with AI assistance, EV certificates, and structured subscription models in just weeks. For Security Operations Center (SOC) teams and information security officers, the threat landscape extends beyond the misuse of legitimate RMM tools; it now includes counterfeit RMM systems designed to overwhelm allowlists and bypass filtering policies based on publisher reputation.



